Abstract
23
Counts:
24 25 When the first stage does not reach the choice of stopping sampling, a second stage is 48 probabilistically involved, which provides a second chance to stop sampling. We found 49 that autistic traits did not influence the choices in either stage but specifically modulated 50 the participant's probability to recruit the second decision stage ("second-thought 51 probability"). In particular, participants with high autistic traits were less flexible in 52 adjusting their second-thought probabilities with the increase of cost. To conclude, high-53 levels of autistic traits are associated with suboptimal information sampling and such 54 suboptimality implies a failure of adjusting the strategic complexity (with or without 55 second thought) appropriately with sampling cost. 56
57

Introduction
75
Information helps to reduce uncertainty in decision making but is often costly to collect. 76
For example, to confirm whether a specific tumor is benign or malignant may require 77 highly invasive surgery procedures. In such cases, it can be more beneficial to tolerate 78 some degree of uncertainty and take actions first. To maximize survival, humans and 79 animals need to balance the cost and benefit of information sampling and sample the 80 
165
People with high AQ are more likely to make costly oversampling 166 We computed efficiency-the expected gain for participants' sample sizes divided by 167 the maximum expected gain-to quantify the optimality of participants' sampling choices 168 and used linear mixed model analyses to identify the effects of AQ and its interactions 169 with sampling cost and information gain (LMM1 for efficiency, see Methods). 170
Participants' efficiency (Fig 2a) was on average 94% (i.e. close to optimality) but 171 decreased with increasing cost ( ",$% = 33.20, < .001) or decreasing evidence ( %,$" = 172 66.24, < .001), and decreased more dramatically when high cost and low evidence 173 occurred together (interaction ",0$ = 47.88, < .001). Though the three AQ groups did 174 not differ in overall efficiency, AQ influenced efficiency through its interaction with cost 175 and evidence (three-way interaction $,$0 = 6.85, < .001). In particular, a significant 176 simple main effect of AQ group was found only under the high cost (0.4 points per 177 sample) and low evidence (60/40) condition ( ",$0.40 = 5.28, = .008), with the high AQ 178 group bearing a lower efficiency compared to those of the low $0.40 = 2.64, = .027) 179 and middle ( $0.40 = 2.97, = .013) AQ groups (single-step corrections were applied to 180 the p values of these post-hoc comparisons and all the post-hoc analyses below, see 181
Methods). 182
The overall high efficiency was accompanied by adaptive sampling behaviors 183 that were modulated by both sampling cost and information gain: Participants drew 184 fewer samples in costlier or more informative conditions (Fig 2b) . A linear mixed model 185 analysis on number of bead samples (LMM2, see Methods) showed main effects of cost 186 test for multimodality, = 0.003, < .001) and were well fit by the mixture of two 211
Gaussian distributions (Fig 3a) . Similar bimodal distributions were observed for 212 individual participants (S1 Fig) and could not simply be artifacts of data aggregation. 213 214 
223
Linear mixed model analysis (LMM3) showed that the mean decision times (Fig  224   3b ) increased with cost ( ",$% = 50.30, < .001) and decreased with evidence ( %,$" = 225
56.15, < .001). 226
A straightforward explanation for the bimodal DT distribution would be a 227 probabilistic mixture of two cognitive processes. Next, we used computational modeling 228 to explore the possibility of two decision stages and showed that it could quantitatively 229 predict the effects of cost and evidence as well as the bimodal distribution of DTs. Sampling is controlled by cost and evidence in two separate stages 231 We considered a variety of models for sampling choices, which fell into two categories: 232 one-stage models and two-stage models (Fig 4a, In two-stage models of sampling choices, we assumed that deciding whether to 244 stop or continue sampling may involve two consecutive decision stages: if stopping 245 sampling is the decision in the first stage, it is finalized and there is no second stage; 246 otherwise, either continuing sampling becomes the final decision, or the decision is re-247 evaluated in a second stage. Whether to enter the second stage is probabilistic, whose 248 probability ("second-thought probability") may vary with sampling cost. The decisions in 249 the two stages are independent and controlled separately by the cost-and evidence-250 related factors and may be subject to evidence decay. In other words, the decision in We fit all the models to participants' sampling choices separately for each 257 participant using maximum likelihood estimates and compared their goodness-of-fit 258 using the Akaike Information Criterion corrected for small samples (AICc) [32, 33] and 259 group-level Bayesian model selection [34, 35] . Lower AICc indicates better fit. Among 260 the four one-stage models (Fig 4b) , the best model was the one that is influenced by 261 both cost and evidence as well as by the decay of evidence (Cost + Evidence w/ 262 decay). However, its counterpart two-stage model with the first and second stages 263 respectively controlled by cost-and evidence-related factors (Cost ® Evidence w/ 264 decay) performed even better, whose probability of outperforming all the other models 265 (protected exceedance probability) was 0.69. 266
In general, two-stage models where cost was considered prior to evidence 267 outperformed their counterpart one-stage models and two-stage models that assumed 268 the reverse order ( individual participants' sampling choices from three aspects: cost-or evidence-related 302 weights (11 parameters), second-thought probabilities (three parameters separately for 303 the three cost conditions), and evidence decay rate (one parameter). We performed a 304 MANOVA for each class of parameters (MANOVA was reduced to ANOVA for the one-305 parameter decay rate) and only second-thought probabilities significantly differed 306 between AQ groups (Wilk's = 0.68, >,0" = 2.79, = .016). Further one-way ANOVAs 307
showed that the mean second-thought probabilities of the three AQ groups were 308 comparable in the zero-cost condition ( ",$" = 1.00, = .84) but had significant 309 differences in the low-cost ( ",$" = 3.84, = .030) and high-cost conditions ( ",$" = 3.52, 310 = .038). Compared with the other two AQ groups, low AQ participants had a lower 311 probability to use the second stage under the 0.1 sampling cost, whereas high AQ 312 participants had a lower probability to use the second stage under the 0.4 sampling cost 313 (Fig 5a) . 314
That is, participants with different levels of autistic traits seemed to differ in 315 behavioral flexibility, that is, how they changed second-thought probabilities with cost. 316
Indeed, when the cost of sampling went from zero to low (Fig 5b, left) , most participants 317 increased their second-thought probabilities and the increase was positively correlated 318 with AQ score (Spearman @ = .37, = .013). However, when the cost went from low to 319 high (Fig 5b, right) , a considerable proportion of participants barely increased their 320 second-thought probabilities, and the increase was negatively correlated with AQ score 321 (Spearman @ = −.36, = .016). That is, higher AQ did not impair participants' 322 distinction between zero and low costs but impaired their ability to flexibly adjust 323 second-thought probabilities for different levels of costs. 
326
(a) Estimated second-thought probabilities for different AQ groups and cost conditions.
327
Compared with the other two AQ groups, low AQ participants had a lower probability to use the 328 second stage under low sampling cost, whereas high AQ participants had a lower probability to 
332
Correlation between AQ scores and cost-dependent changes of the second-thought probability.
333
ΔSecond-thought probability refers to the difference in second-thought probability between two 334 cost conditions. Each black dot is for one participant. Blue lines are regression lines and shade 335 areas represent standard error.
337
That AQ influenced second-thought probabilities but not cost-or evidence-related 338 weights also holds for other two-stage models we considered (S1 Table) . The second 339 decision stage provides an additional opportunity to choose stopping sampling when the 340 first stage does not reach such a choice. High AQ participants' lower second-thought 341 probability in the high-cost condition would thus lead to the costly oversampling and low 342 efficiency we reported earlier (Fig 1) . 343
344
Slow decisions correlate with the use of the second stage
345
Had the bimodal DT distribution arisen from the two-stage decision process assumed in 346 two-stage models, as we conjectured earlier, the mean DT-as a proxy for the 347
proportion of slow decisions-should increase with the probability of using the second 348 stage. Indeed, the mean DT was positively correlated with second-thought probability 349 Moreover, the effects of cost on mean DT (LMM3, as we reported earlier) could be 354 explained away by the effect of second-thought probability when the latter was added 355 as a predictor (LMM4; second-thought probability, %,DE.0D = 9.76, = .004; cost, [14] [15] [16] [17] 37 ]. In the current study, we tested healthy adults with different levels of 367 autistic traits to investigate how autistic traits influence information sampling decisions. 368
We found that participants adjusted their sample sizes according to both sampling cost 369 and evidence gain and were overall close to optimality. However, in the high cost and 370 low evidence condition where the tension between minimizing cost and gathering 371 information was highest, individuals with high autistic traits were farther away from 372 optimality compared to their peers due to oversampling. Further computational modeling 373 revealed which components of the decision process were affected by and which were 374 immune to autistic traits. Participants' sampling choices were best fit by a two-stage 375 decision model, with the second stage serving as a second thought to stop sampling. 376
Participants with high autistic traits differed from others only in that they were less likely 377 to use the second thought to reduce sampling behaviors that had become costly. 378 Previous ASD studies that had used similar bead-sampling tasks yielded 379 inconclusive results: one study found that adolescents with ASD sampled more than the 380 control group [38], whereas a second study of adults with ASD found the reverse [27] . In 381 contrast, we did not find overall oversampling but more subtle atypicality in healthy 382 people with high autistic traits. These seemingly contradicting findings suggest that to 383 ask whether people with ASD or high autistic traits oversample or undersample 384 information is probably not a proper question. In fact, both oversampling and 385 undersampling may lower one's expected gain, depending on the rewarding structure of 386 the environment. As we suggested in the Introduction, a more important question is 387 whether autistic traits influence one's ability to sample optimally, that is, to balance 388 sampling cost and information gain. In previous ASD studies [27,38], sampling incurred 389 no explicit cost but implicit cost such as time or cognitive effort whose exact value to a 390 specific individual is hard to measure, therefore we could hardly compare the optimality 391 of different individuals' performances. By introducing explicit monetary cost for sampling 392 (as Juni et al. did [36] ) in our experiment, we were able to evaluate sampling cost as a 393 potential moderator for autistic trait-related differences in information sampling. Indeed, 394
we found that people with high autistic traits tend to be less optimal than those of low or 395 middle autistic traits when sampling cost is high. 396
It is striking to find that the autistic traits of healthy individuals influence their 397 abilities in performing a non-social and non-perceptual task like information sampling. Here, we aimed to understand through which processes high levels of autistic 408 traits may lead to suboptimal information sampling. Computational modeling allowed us 409 to characterize the decision process of sampling choices by two stages. The existence 410 of a probabilistic second stage is also supported by the bimodality of DT distributions as 411 well as by the positive correlation between mean DT and the second-thought probability 412 estimated from sampling choices. 413
The autistic-trait-related differences we found in decision processes are 414 surprisingly selective. Participants with high autistic traits were indistinguishable from 415 other participants in their ability to weigh sampling cost and evidence gain in the two 416 stages. What they lacked was the flexibility to increase the second-thought probability 417 appropriately under the increase of sampling cost. In other words, as sampling cost 418 increased, participants need to increase their strategic complexity-that is, to have 419 more second thoughts-to reduce unprofitable sampling behaviors but participants with 420 high autistic traits failed to do it well. was sometimes reduced to binary coding [18], we adopted the full 4-point scoring 470 system ("definitely disagree", "slightly disagree", "slightly agree", "definitely agree" 471 respectively scored 0-3) to maximize the coverage of latent autistic traits [25, 28, 44, 45] . Linear mixed models (LMMs). Linear mixed models were estimated using "afex" 514 package [50], whose F statistics, degrees of freedom of residuals (denominators), and 515
p-values were approximated by Kenward-Roger method [51, 52] . Specifications of 516 random effects followed the suggestion of "parsimonious modeling" [53] . For significant 517 fixed effects, "emmeans" package was used to test post hoc contrasts [54] . Interaction 518 contrasts were performed for significant interactions and, when higher-order interactions 519
were not significant, pairwise or consecutive contrasts were performed for significant 520 main effects. Statistical multiplicity of the contrasts was controlled by a single-step 521 adjustment, which used multivariate t distributions to estimate the critical value for 522 conducted contrasts [55, 56] . 523 LMM1: decision efficiency is the dependent variable; fixed effects include an intercept, 524 the main and interaction effects of groups, costs, and ratios (evidence); random effects 525 include correlated random slopes of costs and ratios within participants and random 526 participant intercept. 527 LMM2: number of bead samples is the dependent variable; the fixed and random effects 528 are the same as LMM1. 529 LMM3: decision time is the dependent variable; the fixed and random effects are the 530 same as LMM1. 531 LMM4: the dependent variable is the same as LMM3; in addition to the fixed and 532 random effects of LMM1, the linear effect of second-thought probability is included in 533 the fixed effects, and a random slope of the second-thought probability that is 534 uncorrelated with the random intercept is included in the random effects. 535 536 Decision times (DTs). Because stopping sampling involved a different key press, only 537
DTs for continuing sampling were analyzed. Before any analysis of DTs, the outliers of 538 log-transformed DTs were excluded by nonparametric boxplot statistics based on 539 interquartile ranges (IQR) of all the log-transformed DTs (i.e., valid data are less than 540 1.5 × IQR away from 1st/3rd quartile). 541
542
Modeling
543
Expected gain. Given a specific sequence of bead samples, an ideal observer would 544 always judge the pre-selected jar to be the one whose dominant color is the same as 545 that of the sample sequence. In the case of a tie, the observer would choose the two 546 jars with equal probability. Suppose the sample size is n, the maximal reward is 10 547 points, the unit sampling cost is c, and the percentage of predominated beads in the 548 pre-selected jar is qq. The expected probability of correct judgment is: 549
The expected gain is E[ | , , ] = (10 − ) ( | ). For a specific cost and 551 evidence condition, the optimal sample size is the value of that maximizes 552
One-stage models. We modeled participants' each choice of whether to continue or 554 stop sampling (i.e. whether to press the space bar or Enter key) as a Bernoulli random 555 variable, with the probability of stopping sampling determined by cost-or evidence-556 related factors. Pressing the Enter key after 20 samples was not included as a choice of 557 stopping sampling, because participants had no choice but to stop by then. 558
We considered two families of models: one-stage and two-stage models. In one-559 stage models, the probability of stopping sampling on the i-th trial after having drawn j 560 beads is determined by a linear combination of K decision variables (DVs) via a logistic 561 function: 562 (cumulative information refers to the difference between the numbers of pink and blue 572 bead samples), total log evidence (product of the former two DVs), and the correctness 573 and the number of bead samples in last trial. 574
Cost + evidence one-stage model: both cost-related and evidence-related variables as 575
DVs. 576
Cost + evidence with decay one-stage model: both cost-related and decaying evidence-577 related variables as DVs. 578
In models with decaying evidence, cumulative information (CI) is modulated by a 579 decay parameter : 580
(4) 581
The DVs of absolute value of cumulative information and total log evidence in the decay 582 models are modulated by the decay parameter accordingly. 583
Two-stage models. In two-stage models, sampling choices may involve two decision 584 stages: when the first stage reaches the choice of stopping sampling, it is finalized; 585 otherwise there is chance a second stage is engaged in the choice of continuing or 586 stopping sampling. The overall probability of stopping sampling can thus be written as: 587 (5) 588 (6) 589
(7) 590
Here RS @TUVW % and RS @TUVW " denote the stopping probabilities of the two stages and 591 (sec| ) denotes second-thought probability-the probability of using the second stage 592
given that the first stage concludes with continuing sampling, which may vary with the 593 unit sampling cost. 
